Differential effects of plural ownership and governance mechanisms in limiting shirkers and free riders by Silkoset, Ragnhild et al.
This file was downloaded from BI Brage,  
the institutional repository (open access) at BI Norwegian Business School 
http://brage.bibsys.no/bi 
Differential effects of plural ownership and governance 
mechanisms in limiting shirkers and free riders  
Ragnhild Silkoset 
BI Norwegian Business School 
Arne Nygaard 
Oslo School of Management 
Roland E. Kidwell 
University of Wyoming 
This is the author’s final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article published in 
Corporate Ownership and Control, 13 (2016) 2: 113-131 
Publisher’s version available at http://www.virtusinterpress.org/ 
 The publisher Virtusinterpress allows the author to retain rights to publish the article 
in BI Brage
Differential Effects of Plural Ownership and Governance Mechanisms in 
Limiting Shirkers and Free Riders 1) 
Ragnhild Silkoset  
BI Norwegian Business School 
Department of Marketing  
N-0442 Oslo, Norway  
Phone: +47 464 10 565 
ragnhild.silkoset@bi.no  
Arne Nygaard* 
Oslo School of Management 
Postboks 1155 Sentrum 
 Kirkegaten 24-26, 0107 Oslo , Norway 
arne.nygaard@mh.no 
 Phone 952 43 656 
Roland E. Kidwell 
University of Wyoming 
Department of Management and Marketing 
College of Business 
Dept. 3275, 1000 E. University Ave. 
Laramie, WY, USA 82070 
rkidwell@uwyo.edu 
August 2015 
* - Corresponding author
1 ) The co-authors contributed equally to this paper 
Differential Effects of Plural Ownership and Governance Mechanisms in 
Limiting Shirkers and Free Riders 
Abstract 
Using evidence from paired franchisor-franchisee dyads, this study identifies how plural 
formed ownership mechanisms curb the risk of shirking and free riding in franchise systems. 
These risks have damaging effects on the invested capital of franchisee entrepreneurs.  Although 
shirking and free riding produce a major source of uncertainty for the franchisee entrepreneur it 
can be limited by plural formed governance dimensions. These mechanisms have different effects 
based on unit status, i.e., company owned-units versus franchisee-units.  We tested our model 
using a paired-dyadic data approach to mitigate the problem of shared-method variance among 
the psychometric measures. Results support the contention that competition limits shirking and 
free riding across inter-firm relationships, but did not support the hypothesized role of relational 
mechanisms in lowering potential shirking and free riding.  Also, endogeneity test uncovered that 
dealer’s self-selected into either one of the plural form contracts. Drawing on the economics, 
marketing and management literatures, this study presents a basis for further investigation by 
placing international franchising entrepreneurship into a broader context of transactional and 
relational governance. 
Key words: Free riding, shirking, transactional and relational governance mechanisms, 
franchising, plural form, paired dyadic data, endogeneity test 
Differential Effects of Plural Governance Mechanisms in Limiting 
Shirkers and Free Riders 
 
Introduction 
Franchising dominates the service industry. That is, the plural formed franchising systems 
apply both company owned units and franchisees to represent the exact same concept in the 
market. Although, franchise systems depend on entrepreneurial drive of the franchisees, these 
contracts has also been associated with incentives to free ride and the internal managers to shirk 
(Michael, 2002).  Therefore the entrepreneur that invest in one particular franchise system is 
exposed to the potential risk of free riding and shirking behavior from the other units representing 
the same system. Franchisee entrepreneurs therefore depend on the power of the plural system to 
control these risks (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Franchising as an organizational form is a 
relationship of mutual benefit as well as dependence, grounded in an on-going series of 
transactions and relationships.  Franchising can be seen as an entrepreneurial growth strategy 
(Ketchen, Short and Combs, 2011) where the franchisor rapidly can expand geographically by 
selling territorial rights to franchisees, who pay fees as well as royalties generally based on 
percentages of sales. In the presented context of investigation the multinational oil company 
transformed the concept from a traditional gas station to a convenience store and fast food outlet. 
Both the corporate entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial drive from each franchisee were 
needed to learn how to handle new products within in a new concept and business model. 
Franchisees can reap the benefits of a proven business model and partner with the franchisor in 
operations, marketing and brand development.  However, the common benefits found in 
franchising are tempered by the fact that franchisor and franchisee interests may conflict 
(Michael and Combs, 2008), thus leading to potential negatives for both parties.  Both franchisors 
and each single franchise entrepreneur run the risk of brand damage through the opportunistic 
actions of the other franchisees and managers in the company owned units.   
Participants in franchise systems -- franchisors and franchisees -- derive value from their 
interactions with each other, using elements of contractual as well as relational exchange (Davies, 
et al., 2011).  This study focuses on a key element of this symbiotic relationship: How franchisors 
use transactional and relational governance to maintain brand quality in plural arrangements 
among managers of both company-owned units and franchisee entrepreneurs within a retail 
system.  Governance structures such as incentives, monitoring devices, contracts, norms and 
interpersonal trust are among the safeguards set up between principals and agents to reduce 
opportunistic behavior as a relationship between two parties is established and progresses. 
Despite such mechanisms, opportunistic behavior persists (Jap, 2001; Jap and Anderson, 2003), 
and franchisors are often unable to anticipate and safeguard against such behavior on the part of 
franchisees (Cochet and Garg, 2008) and their own company managers. 
The interdependence of franchisor and franchisee creates the need for an organizational 
arrangement, the plural-formed franchise system, which consists of both corporate-owned units 
and franchised units (Bradach, 1997; Michael, 2000; Kidwell and Nygaard, 2011; Cliquet and 
Penard, 2012; Perryman and Combs, 2012).  The international expansion and success of such 
systems strongly depends on strategies that safeguard brand names against channel member 
shirking and free riding, forms of withholding effort that can be defined as an undersupply of 
quality in interfirm relationships (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  Although researchers have made an 
intensive effort on how to build associations related to a brand (Zablah, Brown, and Donthu, 
2010; Sriram and Kadiyali, 2009; Homburg, Klarmann, and Schmitt, 2010; Kapoor and Heslop, 
2009; Geuens, Weijters, and Wulf, 2009), fewer studies focus on how to protect the brand against 
the behavioural risk of opportunism after it is launched.  
This study makes the following contributions: 1) Using paired-dyadic survey data, it 
extends research in transaction cost theory and opportunistic behavior from buyer-seller 
relationships (e.g., Jap, 2001; Jap and Anderson, 2003) and alliances (e.g., Berkovitz, Jap and 
Nickerson, 2006) to brand protection in plural formed franchise systems thus contributing to the 
study of relationships at the organization level, 2) It examines use of transactional and relational 
mechanisms to curb potential shirking and free riding, thus expanding entrepreneurship research 
to brand-related issues, and 3) It identifies governance mechanisms that have differential effects 
on withholding effort in plural forms by examining both corporate units as well as franchised 
entrepreneurs, extending previous research that focused on franchisee responses to governance 
mechanisms (e.g., Kidwell, Nygaard and Silkoset, 2007). Also, it tests the endogeneity effect of 
governance dimension on dealer’s self-selection of plural contractual choice.  
Conceptual Framework 
Franchise systems generally own and centrally operate some units (company owned 
units), while others are franchised (franchise units) through independent entrepreneurs 
(franchisees) (Perryman and Combs, 2011). Generally, the company owned units report in a 
hierarchical structure to corporate managers whereas the franchise units are owned and operated 
by individual entrepreneurs but monitored to varying degrees by corporate area managers. An 
entrepreneur that invests in a franchisee contract also takes a behavioral risk of opportunism. 
Thus, the study of such plural systems provides the ability to contrast the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms to control opportunism on units that are “members” of the corporation 
with units that tend to be more entrepreneurial, as noted in a recent study of human resource 
practices in a plural franchise system (Brand and Croonen, 2010). 
The plural system reflects both make and buy alternatives (Heide, 2003; Makadok and 
Coff, 2009), described by transaction cost theory as inter-organizational structures designed to 
safeguard transactions against opportunism, such as shirking and free riding (Williamson, 
1985).Transaction cost theory state that markets always create the most efficient incentives. Only 
when the franchisor invests in i.e. brands, it has to safeguard its specific assets against 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). The franchise entrepreneur invests in unique assets as 
well. The franchisee often has to undergo a course program to learn how to operate the concept 
and technology. Furthermore, the franchisee entrepreneur has to invest both in site specific assets, 
physical specific assets and human specific assets. This unique capital has little or no value 
outside the franchise system. Thus the single franchisee entrepreneur is exposed to “the horizon 
of opportunism” from the other units. Transaction cost associated with the asset specificity of the 
brand is created by incentive conflicts with the other company owned units and franchisees.  
Although we point at franchisees investments in specific assets, that drive potential 
opportunism, we also apply agency theory to further understand the franchise system in an 
information asymmetry context. Like Anderson and Oliver (1987) we combine TCE and agency 
theory as complementary perspectives that add explanatory power into the investigation of 
franchise systems (Bergen et al.,1992). There is an agency relationship if a franchisor (principal) 
gives an agent (franchisee or company owned unit manager) the rights to represent the franchisor 
brand and concept in the market (Bergen et al.,1992). In other words, the franchisee and the 
manager of a company owned unit is agents representing the interests of the franchisor. 
Franchising as an agency problem has been seen as an information asymmetry problem in 
combination with opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989). In a franchise system, the franchisor can 
choose between an outcome based franchisee contracts or a behavior based employee manager 
contract (company owned units). This investigation captures both alternatives proposed in agency 
theory (Bergen et al., 1992).  
Following the logic of transaction cost theory and agency theory we examine the extent to 
which governance dimensions (centralized decision making, formalization) and relational 
governance mechanisms (communication) (Van de Ven,  1976) and the business environment 
(intra- and inter-brand competition) affect opportunism (Achrol et al.,1983), given the ownership 
structure, i.e., company owned (corporate) units or franchised units. Transaction cost theory and 
agency theory is viable theories to study franchisor-dealer interactions, brand representation and 
opportunistic behavior as (Hussain et al., 2012; Hennart, 2010).  
Lowering quality standards is opportunistic behavior that jeopardizes brand strategy and 
produces a risk to franchisee entrepreneurs. Because franchisors delegate the rights to represent a 
brand to either an internal employee manager or franchisee entrepreneur retail unit, the quality 
reputation of the brand is at stake. When one dealer cheats on quality, all dealers operating under 
the brand are affected. Examples of such shirking and free riding include stale hot dogs, dirty 
restrooms, inferior repair service and other shoddy offerings (Png and Reitman,  1995).  
Motivated by short-term interests, lowering standards in this manner hurts perceived brand 
quality across units and the “intangible, overall feeling about a brand” (Aaker,  1996, p.86). Thus, 
through these acts of shirking and free riding, brand value and the overall franchise organization 
are harmed. Consequently, these problems jeopardize entrepreneurial investments in franchisee 
units. 
 In placing its reputation in the hands of dealers, the franchisor faces an important 
strategic problem of collective behavior between a franchisor and its plural formed retail 
network. This raises the issue of safeguarding brand name capital from degradation by the 
individual dealers. Dealers operating under the brand may supply lower quality associated with 
their representation (Wathne and Heide,  2000), thus franchisors must build constructive inter-
firm alliances and effective internal mechanisms to protect brand name value and reputation from 
degradation (Davidson,  1982).  As detailed later, we predict that the effects of vertical 
governance designed to control shirking and free riding will in some cases vary depending on the 
ownership status of the individual unit.  
Opportunistic behavior in interorganiztional relationships and plural forms  
 This study extends previous theoretical and empirical work regarding opportunistic 
behavior in buyer-supplier relationships (Jap, 2001; Jap and Anderson, 2003; Jap and Anderson, 
2007) and examines antecedents of opportunistic behavior in the context of a brand marketing 
channel in a plural formed system. Previous research on interorganizational relationships has 
found that specialized investments result in joint competitive advantages among buyers and 
sellers, but these advantages, which have positive economic outcomes, decay over time due to 
suspicions of opportunistic behavior in the relationship (Jap, 2001).   
Michael (2000) applied the concept to franchising; arguing that running company owned 
units provides the franchisor with the ability to measure relative performance of franchisees and a 
wealth of operational knowledge, allowing for franchisor bargaining power with the franchisee in 
part to control free riding in the relationship. Using a transaction cost framework, Heide (2003) 
applied plural governance to examine why a firm would use both market contracting and vertical 
integration for basically the same transaction. He found that plural governance can be employed 
to deal with opportunistic behaviors that result from information asymmetry between buyers and 
suppliers. Such a plural form arrangement strikes a balance between a desire to control adjacent 
businesses and a need to be strategically flexible (Harrigan, 1984). Vertical integration, licensing, 
long-term contracts, joint ventures, global coalitions, dynamic networks and other types of 
alliances can all be examples of plural forms (Bradach and Eccles, 1989).  Furthermore Perryman 
and Combs (2012) support a symbiotic view of plural forms. Theory of plural forms proposes 
that it is efficient to use both company owned units and external units (Parmigiani, 2007). Here 
we develop an empirical model based on the costs of withholding efforts in plural formed 
systems (Kidwell and Nygaard, 2011).   
 
 Effects of withholding effort and damage to brand reputation 
 Opportunistic behavior among franchisees can include releasing proprietary information 
about the franchise, not making royalty payments, free riding on the brand and not complying 
with quality standards (Combs, Ketchen, Shook and Short,  2011; El Akremi, Mignonac, and 
Perrigot,  2011).  The brand-owner franchisor often invests heavily in marketing, promotion and 
communication to build the reputation of quality associated with the brand. These unique 
investments have limited alternative value in the market (Williamson,  1999). Whereas the 
franchise unit may tend to undersupply quality profile efforts, the company owned unit manager 
has no economic incentive to avoid supplying quality. The company owned unit manager may 
instead reduce efforts in general.  
Failure to supply quality and/or engage in brand-building efforts by franchisee- and/or 
company owned-unit managers are examples of  withholding effort (shirking or free riding) on 
job-related tasks (Kidwell and Bennett,  1993).  A company owned unit manager’s failure to 
provide full effort is shirking, which occurs when employee agents who lack an ownership stake 
lower effort levels because their efforts are not linked to their incomes (Kidwell and Nygaard, 
2011).  A franchisee’s lowering of service or product quality to cut costs and obtain the 
nondivisible benefits of brand identity without bearing a proportional share of the costs is free 
riding (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985) on the efforts of other units as well as the franchisor. In 
theory, the costs of shirking or free riding do not necessarily reduce a single retail unit’s short 
term cash flow.  Instead, the unit may increase profits by reducing his/her share of the costs 
associated with brand representation. Caves and Murphy (1976, p.577) state that “A franchisee 
who reduces the quality of the good or service he offers for a given price might increase his own 
profits, yet by disappointing buyers` expectations he could reduce by a greater amount the net 
returns to the common intangible goodwill asset – maintained by the franchisor and used jointly 
by his other franchisees.” 
Conflicts of interest between the owner of the brand name (franchisor) and each 
franchised unit produce the costs of opportunistic behavior (Rubin,  1978). Franchisees have an 
incentive to free ride on the brand by lowering quality thus depreciating brand reputation and the 
franchisor’s future profits (Klein,  1980).  This conflict of interest might vary with the ownership 
structure in the plural franchise system (Brickley, Dark and Weisbach,  1991).  Thus, the way the 
company chooses to organize its corporate units and its franchised units might affect these costs. 
For example, Bradach (1998) indicated eight out of 10 franchise systems in the restaurant 
industry combined company owned units and franchise units.  
Accordingly, due to these connections, opportunistic behavior by single retail units can 
adversely influence the business of all units (i.e. corporate, franchisees, licensed companies, etc.) 
under the same brand name. Anomalies may include service equipment in poor condition, 
untrained or impolite staff, etc. Whereas the brand company invests in reputation, a retail unit has 
incentives to ride free on the brand reputation if the negative effects of inferior service and 
product quality are not borne directly by the dealer. Thus, all other dealers in the network must 
bear the negative consequences of withholding effort. 
Also, dealers make choices which generate comparative advantages. These choices are not 
random, but are based on expectations of how the alternatives would affect the company’s future 
performance (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003 p. 51). By treating contractual choices as ex-ante 
decisions, we investigate whether dealers were self-selected into either one of the plural form 
contracts. To test this assumption, the study implements a two-step procedure by Maddala 
(1983). First, the retail units might have made an ex-ante choice of ownership based on how the 
franchisor manages the company owned and the franchise units (Bradach, 1997). This means that 
ownership type might be endogenous with the dimensions centralization, formalization and 
communication in the model. Accordingly, it analyses whether the governance factors affects the 
retail unit’s contractual choice. Second, the retail units might have made an ex-ante choice of 
ownership based on their potential to withhold efforts. This means that ownership type might be 
endogenous with withholding efforts. These two situations will be analyzed and discussed more 
in detail in the result section.  
  
Hypothesis Development 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the research model, illustrating the multi-informant 
research strategy and the variables/relationships of interest in the study.  The make/buy (company 
owned/franchisee) element of the model locates it in a plural-form system.  In summary, 
transactional governance mechanisms, i.e., centralization and formalization, and relational 
governance mechanisms, i.e., communication, are predicted to be antecedents of the potential for 
opportunistic behavior in the company owned and the franchised units. Intra and inter -brand 
competition reflect conditions in the channel environment proposed to affect withholding effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Antecedents of withholding effort in a plural-form franchise system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transactional Mechanisms: Centralization and Formalization  
The use of clear mechanisms to control opportunistic behavior on the part of 
organizational partners’ is a general assumption when transaction cost theory is applied to the 
study of relationships between firms (Stump and Heide, 1996).  Therefore, vertical governance 
through centralization and formalization is seen as one way to address the problem of 
withholding effort. In the franchising context, this posture is indicated by the franchisor’s 
motivation to safeguard its brand capital by increased vertical control of transactions 
(Williamson,  1985); key means to achieve that end is central control of a firm’s channel 
decisions and formal rules that guide behavior of the agents.   
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According to transaction cost theory, the implementation of more centralized control 
decreases the players’ conflict of interests. Although it is possible that company owned units may 
have more knowledge about local markets and thus react negatively to centralized decisions, we 
argue that looser connections regarding decision making tend to increase the incentives for 
managerial shirking in company owned units.  Centralized decision making leads to consistency 
between the strategic and operational decision levels and to convergent goals between the 
principal and agent (Arrow, 1974; Williamson, 1975), in this case, franchisor and 
manager/employee. The owner of the brand responds to potential costs of  shirking, and 
centralized interfirm control leads to lower levels of  shirking (Ruekert, Walker and Roering,  
1985).  Following the argument from transaction cost theory, centralization increases the ability 
to coordinate efficiently, and the potential for safeguarding long-term interests in the market. 
Centralized decisions reduce role ambiguity and conflicts for the company owned units (Nygaard 
and Dahlstrom,  2002). As a result, increased centralization is a response to anticipated costs of 
shirking in the employee manager/owner relationship (Alchian and Demsetz,  1972). Therefore, 
centralization negatively affects shirking under such circumstances.  
 Unlike company owned units, franchisee dealers are entrepreneurs that benefit from local 
market knowledge, managerial talent and entrepreneurial drive. Due to these factors, franchisees, 
unlike employee managers, may not favor centralized franchisor decisions. Rather, research 
findings indicate centralized interfirm decisions might constraint entrepreneurial spirit and 
managerial drive among franchisees (Kidwell et al., 2007). Consequently, although centralized 
decision making may hamper shirking among company owned units, it may encourage free riding 
among franchisee units. 
H1: The higher the level of centralization in channel decisions, a) the lower the potential 
for withholding effort among company owned units, and b) the higher the potential for 
withholding effort among franchisee units. 
  
Formal rules and regulations describe dyadic expectations for the purpose of restricting 
potential withholding of effort the franchisor can promulgate rules, restrictions, standards and 
operating procedures designed to protect the quality image reflected in the brand. Although 
formalization potentially creates stability and predictability and reduces uncertainty, it can also 
suppress self-regulation and autonomy among the company owned units, thus increasing the 
likelihood of shirking among employee managers in these units. Company owned units are not 
outcome dependent agents, so increased formalization does not decrease their risk (Bergen, Dutta 
and Walker,  1992).  Formalization, through dysfunctional means-ends inversion and goal 
displacement often seen in bureaucratic organizations (Merton, 1957), might instead hamper 
individual initiative and innovative behavior. The resulting reduced initiative can lead to greater 
frustration among the employee managers who then disregard company policies and procedures. 
Consequently, increased formalization may lead to an increase in  shirking among company 
owned units (John,  1984). 
In contrast to the company owned units, formalization has the potential to clarify the 
interaction between the franchisee unit and the franchisor company. Although formal 
arrangements are often incomplete and misaligned over time, they also create stability and 
predictability in the relationship. Aaker (2004) consistently suggests that standardization of a 
service operation is an effective approach to achieving reliable quality and brand equity. As a 
result, formalization may provide a stable framework, making it easier for the parties to make 
plans and reduce uncertainty (Kidwell et al., 2007). Those franchisees who are more risk averse 
appreciate increased formalization resulting in reduced uncertainty (Bergen et al.,  1992), thus 
one might assume that they welcome formalization of the relationship because one beneficial 
consequence for the franchisee entrepreneur is lower uncertainty (Thompson,  1967). 
Formalization therefore reduces the potential for conflicts of interest and free riding among 
franchisees. 
H2: The higher the level of formalization, a) the higher the potential for withholding 
effort among company owned units, and, b) the lower the potential for withholding effort 
among franchisee units. 
 
Relational Mechanisms: Communication 
 
Previous research indicates that relational mechanisms including goal congruence, 
interpersonal trust and bilateral investments, can lessen detrimental effects of cheating among 
buyers and suppliers (Jap,  2001); when withholding of effort reaches higher levels, interpersonal 
trust becomes less effective but goal congruence is then a more powerful safeguard (Jap and 
Anderson, 2003).  Berkovitz, Jap and Nickerson (2006) found that cooperative exchange norms 
play a role in performance relationships in strategic research and development alliances in those 
deviations between actual and expected levels of normative development affect exchange 
performance in the relationship, potentially leading to increased levels of shirking and free riding. 
In a study of distribution channel resellers regarding cooperative interorganizational relationships 
with manufacturers, Jap and Anderson (2007) found that goal congruence and information 
exchange norms fade after the build-up stage of the relationship life cycle, yet relationship 
harmony and reseller trust in the manufacturer maintain into the mature stage of the life cycle.  In 
a logistics context, Fugate, Stank and Mentzer (2009) found that a shared interpretation of 
knowledge among operational personnel and an enhanced knowledge management process were 
positively related to operational and firm performance.  These studies indicate the potential 
impact of relational mechanisms on opportunistic behavior and performance outcomes in 
interorganizational relationships. 
    The level of communication between two parties is a dimension that can reflect a 
relational mechanism that has the potential to limit opportunistic behavior and enhance 
cooperation (cf., Axelrod, 1984; Dant and Nasr, 1998).  A high degree of communication may 
include the dealer unit more closely in planning and coordinating processes of the franchisor 
company. We propose that this effect will occur for both employee managers of company owned 
units and franchisees in franchised units. Closer cooperation between parties means information 
is more accessible to both franchisor and dealer. The magnitude and scope of the communication 
will thus increase inter-firm adaptation. Moreover, communication should help align interests of 
all parties. Communication initiated by the franchisor redirects franchisee dealers’ and employee 
managers’ motivation toward best serving the interests of the owner of the brand name.  
The marketing channel literature portrays interaction as autonomous and voluntary 
cooperation by both parties in the dyad (Dwyer and Welsh,  1985).  Acceptance of the right to 
make decisions regarding the collaboration improves transaction climate and reduces the level of 
unit potential for withholding effort, that is, the two parties can interact to combine resources in a 
way that creates synergy and reduces the need for bargaining and control. Thus, we propose that 
communication increases the openness between the parties and at the same time it decreases 
withholding effort on the part of the dealer, both company owned and franchisee.  
H3: The higher the degree of communication, a) the lower the potential for withholding 
effort among company owned units, and b) the lower the potential for withholding effort 
among franchisee units. 
 
Competitive environment 
The competitive environment is also expected to influence the potential for withholding 
effort (Nygaard and Myrtveit,  2000), thus its potential effects should be considered in the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship. When brand competition is weak, retail units reduce brand 
building efforts because of the lower degree of competitive pressure. Low pressure may also 
decrease motivation to attend to obligations and efforts aimed at maintaining quality.  
Furthermore, less market competition obstructs transparency of information because the 
franchisor cannot easily compare retail units. Less competition makes control costly and renders 
the franchisor more vulnerable to withholding effort. As a result, small number market situations 
encourage shirking and free riding (Williamson,  1985).  
Bradach (1997) emphasized the importance of competition between franchise and 
company owned units in the plural franchise system. When intra-brand (among retail units 
operating under the same brand) or inter-brand (between units operating with different brands) 
competition increases, the unit -- faced with  potential risk of the unit’s financial failure -- will be 
forced to avoid withholding effort (Machlup,  1967). Thus, as competition within and between 
brands intensifies, retail units will increase the quality efforts signaled by brand values, lessening 
the potential for withholding effort.  
H4: The higher the level of intra-brand competition, a) the lower the potential for 
withholding effort among company owned units, and b) the lower the potential for 
withholding effort among franchisee units. 
 
H5: The higher the level of inter-brand competition, a) the lower the potential for 
withholding effort among company owned units, and b) the lower the potential for 
withholding effort among franchisee units. 
 
Research Design 
Sampling 
The threat of random irrelevancies of causalities among constructs was managed by 
controlling extraneous sources of variation (Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 44). The theoretical 
relationships were therefore tested in a homogenous setting.We selected gasoline stations with 
convenience stores as the sampling frame in this study. These stations had the same business 
format, products and service offerings as well as a similar technical interrelationship with the 
franchisor (payment system, IT interface system, logistics/storage systems etc.). Consequently, 
we sought to keep third variables as constant as possible even though the set of company owned 
units reported through the corporate hierarchy of an oil company whereas the franchised units 
were outside the corporate system.  Interorganizational research has previously used oil 
companies as an empirical research setting (John, 1984; Png and Reitman,  1995; Nygaard and 
Dahlstrøm,  2002; Shepard,  1993). 
The first step was to collect data from the dealers. The plural-formed oil company had 
520 gasoline stations in the market. The survey included the 320 gas stations that included 
convenience stores with a standardized operation agreement with the company regulating 
bilateral exchange. After contacting all of these gas stations, we received data from 192 of the 
dealers, a 60 percent response rate.  A priori, we postulated that the different ownership 
relationships between the company and the retail units affect governance within the firm. Based 
on this, the initial sample consisted of company owned units, i.e., company-owned units, and 
franchisee units, i.e., franchisee owned and operated units. The company owned units returned 
128 responses whereas the franchisee unit sample consisted of 64 respondents.  
 Paired dyadic data approach 
Theoretically, the interfirm transaction is the level of analysis (Williamson,  1985, p. 41). 
Thus, the theoretical model required dyadic data, and a multi-informant strategy was instrumental 
to address the theoretical concepts in the model. Therefore, we sent a second round of 
questionnaires to sales area managers in the company. Each of the sales area managers serves a 
group of convenience store/gas stations in the market. We randomly selected retail units from the 
two groups of dealers who had answered the questionnaires in the first round, i.e. the company-
owned stations (company owned-units) and the franchisee stations (franchisee-units). To ensure 
variation in the independent variables we chose a stratified random sampling design (Judd, Smith 
and Kidder,  1991). Consequently, we increased the proportion of company owned-unit 
(employee-managed) stations in the final dyadic sample. We asked sales area managers to 
sequentially fill out questionnaires referring specifically to retail units operating in their 
respective areas. We obtained 72 usable questionnaires from the sales area managers in the 
franchisor company. Consequently, we linked 144 respondents (72 sales area manager responses 
and 72 retail unit manager responses) into true-paired dyads; 58.3 percent of the respondents 
represent company owned units, and 41.6 percent represent franchisee units.   
Our paired dyadic data approach represented a multi-informant strategy to the structural 
analyses. The sales area managers reported governance dimensions (centralization, formalization, 
and communication) while managers (franchisees or employees; both identified as dealers in the 
appendix of survey items) reported potential for withholding effort, business environment and 
ownership structure. Because of the novel nature of the study, previous research was unable to 
guide our attempt to build “unit potential for withholding effort” as a construct in this research 
setting; previous measures of withholding effort used in buyer-seller relationships (e.g., Jap and 
Anderson, 2003) were inappropriate. To investigate the issue, we organized an expert group 
consisting of one employee dealer (company owned unit), one franchisee dealer (franchisee unit), 
one sales area manager from the company, and one logistics director. Discussions with the expert 
group produced valuable insights for initial design and measurement models.  
After designing the scales, we conducted a qualitative pilot survey using interviews with 
representative respondents. When a question did not generate variation or answers indicated the 
informant did not understand the question, we talked with the respondent and returned to the 
expert group with representatives from the company for suggestions on how to improve face 
validity of the measurement model.  
We conducted a pilot test and went back to an expert group with the results in order to 
ensure face validity of all constructs. An independent-samples t-test analysis of early and late 
responses did not indicate any response bias. All of the items used in the final model are 
presented in the appendix.  
Dependent variable: Unit potential for withholding effort  
 Unit potential for withholding effort was measured with a four-item scale that reflects the 
unit manager’s opinion regarding the quality restrictions in the contract with the franchisor. This 
strategy was undertaken because we anticipated that the dealer would not directly admit or report 
that s/he broke the quality restrictions. Retail managers were asked to what extent the following 
sentences gave an erroneous or correct description: 1) It is totally unnecessary to control the way 
customer service is done at our station, 2) The company restriction to wear uniforms is necessary, 
3) The company restrictions to keep the station clean and tidy are necessary and relevant to us 
and our station, 4) It is no problem to keep the station perfectly clean even when there are a lot of 
customers. The latter three items were reverse scored providing a measure of unit potential for 
withholding effort to occur.  
Possible behaviors linked to the withholding effort items entail costs due to degradation of 
the brand name caused by inferior products or service quality produced by single retail units in 
the market. The items measure how much the dealer is dedicated to the standard quality signaled 
by the brand name. For example, dealers who refuse to wear uniforms take opportunistic 
advantage of other dealers’ efforts to build a brand profile in the market. Likewise, dealers who 
do not follow cleaning instructions or prefer to boost sales rather than maintain cleanliness in the 
station take advantage of the quality efforts of other dealers operating under the brand name. The 
dealer, company owned or franchise, must ensure quality in all station activities that normally 
signal quality to the customers. The question, therefore, is whether the dealer informs his/her 
employees about quality standards and the importance of such standards. We assumed that if an 
employee at a gas station were uninformed about quality standards established by the brand-
owning company, s/he was unable to maintain brand standards and thus there was higher 
potential for withholding effort. Other parties in the distribution system must bear the losses 
caused by such withholding of effort because the focal dealer was not properly engaged in quality 
management. The Cronbach Alpha for unit potential for withholding effort in our sample was 0.7.   
Independent Variables  
Centralized decision making: The definition of centralization of interfirm decisions is the 
perceived level of asymmetrical company decisions and implementation associated with the 
relation between the brand owner company (franchisor) and the single franchise unit (Van de Ven 
and Ferry,  1979). Centralization is the hierarchical governance structure that manages the 
relationship. Several other studies have operationalized the concept (i.e. Dwyer,  1995). The 
operationalization of the theoretical concept benefits from these studies and the pretest interviews 
with dealers and company-managers. Because we had a setting where the power relationship was 
highly asymmetrical, the five items focus on how the franchisor influenced company owned and 
franchisee dealers. The construct of centralization reflected the need to receive permission from 
the franchisor company and the freedom of the dealer to make autonomous decisions regarding 
retail activities. The Cronbach Alpha for centralization was 0.7. 
Formalization: This study defines the concept of formalization as the perceived degree to 
which fixed policies, rules, operating procedures and programmability influence the 
interorganizational exchange. The operationalization followed the guidelines provided by 
previous research (Dwyer,  1995) as well as pre-test interviews. The construct of formalization 
reflected the programmability and the level of standardized procedures of deliveries, the 
formalized expected distribution of rules in the relationship as well as the level of formalization 
of interorganizational communication. The Cronbach Alpha for the four formalization items was 
0.7. 
 Communication: The concept of communication can be defined as vertical flows of 
activities, resources and information from the franchisor company to the dealer (Van de Ven,  
1976). Again, because we investigated a franchisor–dealer relationship, the operationalization 
indicates the magnitude and scope of assistance, service and programs offered by the brand name 
owner (franchisor). These activities contain both constructive contacts between the parties and 
communication between the parties so as to increase the competitiveness of the dealers. We have 
measured vertical communication through perceptions of joint activities and programs, and 
assistance systems developed to help realize the exchange between the parties in the distribution 
system. Previous research guided our operationalization of the concept (Dwyer,  1995).  The 
Cronbach Alpha for the six communication items was 0.8. 
Channel environment: Two dimensions measured the channel environment. Both intra-
brand competition and inter-brand competition were ordinal scaled with a single-item approach 
and include measurement error in the final analysis.  
Control variable: Firm size 
We use sales revenue as a proxy for unit size to control whether unit size affects dealer’s 
motivation for withholding effort by applying the sales revenue from the dealers’ accounting 
data.  Dess and Robinson (1984) strongly recommend using objectively defined data whenever 
they are available. Whereas both company owned and franchisee units were small in terms of 
sales and number of employees, an independent samples t-test indicated that company-owned 
units in the study were significantly larger than franchisee units in terms of sales volume and 
revenue. Thus, the company-owned units were not only directly tied to corporate control; they 
were larger in size than the franchisee units.  
Measurement model / Convergent and discriminant validity 
Our use of dyadic data enabled us to mitigate the problem of shared-method variance 
among the psychometric measures (Campbell and Fiske,  1959). Such common-method bias 
entails a major validity risk that may influence the test results (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee,  and 
Podsakoff,  2003; Viswanathan,  2005, p. 189). This use of paired-dyadic data made it impossible 
to bias the observed relationship between the sales area manager’s governance dimensions and 
the retail unit’s potential for withholding effort, and is the preferred approach according to 
Podsakoff et al. (2003). In the analyses, we therefore used the sales area manager sample to 
account for the predictor governance dimensions and the retail unit sample to account for the unit 
withholding effort criterion variable and the other variables in a paired-dyadic structural equation 
model.  
To increase the credibility of the structural modeling, we used a test-retest statistical 
method to examine the reliability of the analyses. Accordingly, the initial scale refinement was 
done on those 120 dealer respondents whose data were not used as part of the 72 dyads in the 
structural model. Our first step, in accordance with the Anderson and Gerbing (1988) two-step 
approach, identified the factorial validity of the scores. We did this by running a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA), using EQS 6.1 for windows (Bentler,  2006) and the 120 dealer respondent 
sample. The standardized factor loadings for all of the items were above the level of |.3|. The fit 
indices for the CFA reported a significant Chi-square at 314.567 based on 228 degrees of 
freedom (df) and a p-value at > .05. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) reported to be .99. The 
Root Mean-square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) value were .07, with a 95 percent 
confidence interval between .05 and .08. The Standardized Root Mean-square Residual 
(Standardized RMR) reported to be .09.  
To assess discriminant validity, Fornell and Larcker (1981, pp. 45-46) indicate that for 
any two constructs, A and B, the average variance extracted for both constructs need to be larger 
than the shared variance (i.e., square of the correlation) between A and B. These criteria were met 
in this study. The constructs’ standardized factor loadings together with corresponding z-values 
can be found in Table 1, while Table 2 reports the correlation matrix and the descriptive statistics 
for the dealer sample. Table 2 also includes the descriptive statistics of the two sub-samples of 
company owned-units and franchise-units. Based on Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
none of the variables reports to have significant, equal, variance. Two of the constructs reports to 
have significant mean difference among the company owned-units sample and the franchise-units 
sample. These are centralized decision making, where the company owned-units sample reported 
the highest mean value of 2.32, while franchise-units reported a mean value of 2.22. Also, for 
communication the company owned-units sample reported the highest mean values of 4.68 while 
the value for franchise-units were 4.13.  
  
 Table 1 
Measurement model of the study items 
 
Items Factor Loadings z-
scores 
Potential for 
withholding effort 
  
Item1 .33a --b 
Item2 .65 (3.11) 
Item3 .91 (3.12) 
Item4 .39 (2.29) 
Centralized decision making 
Item1 .39 -- 
Item2 .66 (3.25) 
Item3 .46 (2.85) 
Item4 .52 (2.99) 
Item5 .57 (3.11) 
Formalization   
Item1 .79 -- 
Item2 .50 (4.75) 
Item3 .79 (6.38) 
Item4 .37 (3.46) 
Communication    
Item1 .82 -- 
Item2 .80 (7.84) 
Item3 .45 (4.19) 
Item4 .53 (4.39) 
Item5 .43 (4.30) 
Item6 .59 (5.92) 
Item7 .52 (5.17) 
Intra-brand competition  
Item1 1.00 -- 
Inter-brand competition  
Item1 1.00 -- 
Firm size   
Item1 1.00 -- 
Fit indices   
Chi-square 314.57  
Df 228  
p-value .05  
CFI .99  
S-RMR .09  
RMSEA .07  
 
n = 144 (72 paired dyads) 
a Standardized factor loadings 
b z-score marked with -- are fixed to 1.00 for the purpose of scaling 
 
  
Table 2 
Correlation matrix for the measurement scales 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Potential for withholding effort        
        
2 Centralized decision making .18       
 (.05)a       
3 Formalization -.15 .18      
 (.11) (.05)      
4 Communication -.10 .26 .47     
 (.30) (.00) (.00)     
5 Intra-brand competition 
 
-.10 .14 -.01 -.04    
 (.26) (.13) (.91) (.71)    
6 Inter-brand competition 
 
.03 .08 .083 .06 .28   
 (.71) (.39) (.36) (.53) (.00)   
7 Firm size -.15 .35 .01 .16 .16 .10 -.02 
 (.11) (.00) (.95) (.09) (.09) (.28) (.86) 
Descriptive statistics:        
Mean value 2.38 3.15 4.42 3.11 5.47 3.20 1.01 
St. deviation .83 1.21 1.16 1.17 1.29 1.81 .27 
Skewness .69 .61 .10 .39 -1.23 .38 -1.37 
Kurtosis .83 .61 -.48 -.55 2.03 -1.19 4.56 
 
Descriptive statistics for the company owned-units sample: 
Mean value 2.31 4.34 5.26 4.68 2.98 5.57 1.07 
St. deviation .93 1.10 .87 .82 1.79 1.17 .27 
Descriptive statistics for the franchise-units sample: 
Mean value 2.22 3.68 5.08 4.13 3.50 5.47 .98 
St. deviation .66 .96 .91 0.92 1.96 1.43 .24 
Independent-samples t-test:        
Mean difference .10 .65 .17 .56 .52 .10 .09 
t-value .53 2.69 .82 2.65 1.16 .33 1.47 
Sig-level (.60) (.01) (.42) (.01) (.25) (.74) (.15) 
 n = 144 (72 paired dyads)  
a Two-tailed level of significance in parenthesis 
  
 Results 
Based on the tests just described, the convergent and divergent validity were within 
reasonable limits. Thus, we continued to the structural model with the remaining responses (72 
paired dyads), where the 72 retail unit responses accounted for the dependent variable and the 72 
sales area manager respondents accounted for the independent variables in the structural model. 
This accomplished the second step in the Anderson and Gerbing’s two-step approach (1988). We 
analyzed the structural relationships by EQS/Windows 6.1 (Bentler,  2006). Table 3 presents the 
correlation matrices for franchise-unit and company owned-unit samples, while Model 1 and 
Model 2 in Table 4 present the results from the hypothesis tests. The structural relationship was 
based on a two-group analysis for the structural model, distinguishing between company owned-
units and franchise-units (see appendix for the associated respondents). 
  
 Table 3 
Correlation matrix for the sample units 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Potential for withholding   -.05 .07 -.07 -.08 -.22 -.16 
 effort  (.80) (.71) (.71) (.67) (.24) (.41) 
2 Centralized decision making -.05  .65 .77 .14 .04 -.02 
  (.74) a  (.00) (.00) (.46) (.83) (.94) 
3 Formalization .06 .41  .3 .02 .01 .03 
  (.73) (.01)  (.04) (.93) (.97) (.88) 
4 Communication .07 .59 .25  .12 -.15 .23 
  (.68) (.00) (.11)  (.55) (.43) (.23) 
5 Intra-brand competition -.17 .01 .34 -.10  .37 -.11 
  (.28) (.98) (.02) (.54)  (.05) (.57) 
6 Inter-brand competition -.21 .06 .02 .18 .33  .30 
  (.18) (.69) (.90) (.26) (.03)  (.11) 
7 Firm size -.14 .27 .08 .22 -.05 .11  
  (.39) (.08) (.62) (.15) (.77) (.49)  
Above diagonal Franchise-units 
Below diagonal Company owned-units 
n = 144 (72 paired dyads)  
a Two-tailed level of significance in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 4 
Estimates on Potential for withholding effort 
 
 Structural Equation Modeling Difference Endogeneity analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 test Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 
Independent variables:  Company owned-
units 
Franchise-units Model 1 and 
2 
Probit regression  Company owned-
units 
Franchise-units 
Centralized decision making -.75a (-1.75b) * .74a (1.38b) † 4.55c  * -.54d (-3.98b) ** 1.45d (3.10e) ** -.53d (-.90e)  
Formalization .54 (1.65) * -.47 (-2.69) ** 3.71   -.15 (-1.35)  .18 (1.15)  -.25 (-1.40)  
Communication .36 (1.85) * -.18 (-.71)  .90   .26 (2.18) * -.66 (-2.81) ** .19 (.63)  
Intra-brand competition -.23 (-1.62) † -.03 (-.20)  .38  .14 (2.31) ** -.29 (-2.50) ** .12 (.41)  
Inter-brand competition  -.29 (-1.67) * -.33 (-2.02) * .20  -.16 (-1.84) † .21 (1.37)  -.21 (-1.35)  
Firm size  .02 (.17)  .09 (.62)  .11  -.00 (-.30)        
Constant         1.55 (2.57) ** 2.27 (3.43) ** 3.40 (6.61) ** 
Mills-ratio company owned-
units 
           -3.06 (-2.67) **    
Mills-ratio franchise-units               -1.67 (.30)  
R-squared .31   .37     .18   .12   .11   
Chi-square 317.22   379.33              
df 203   203              
p-value .01   .01              
CFI .99   .98              
SRMR .12   .13              
RMSEA .12   .17              
 
a  Standardized regression coefficients 
b z-scores 
c Chi-square 
d Coefficients 
e t-scores 
† significant at the .10 level 
* significant at the .05 level 
** significant at the .01 level 
 
 
First, we investigated the correlation between manager’s governance dimensions 
(centralization, formalization, and communication) and dealer’s potential for withholding effort. 
First, for Hypothesis 1, we tested the effect of centralization on withholding effort. For H1a, we 
found that centralization for company owned-units had a markedly and significantly negative 
effect on unit withholding effort (H1a: -.75, p-value < .05). For H1b, the relationship for 
franchisee units reported a marked, although marginally significant, positive effect of 
centralization on unit withholding effort (H1b: .74, p-value < .10).  This provides support for H1a 
and weak support for H1b.  Hypothesis 2 concerned the effect of company formalization on 
dealer withholding effort. For H2a, we found that formalization increased potential withholding 
effort in the company owned units. The statistical test supported the hypothesis (H2a: .54, p-value 
< .05). H2b, a negative relationship between formalization and withholding effort for franchisee 
units, was statistically supported in our analysis (H2b: -.47, p-value < .01).  For the final 
governance dimension, Hypothesis 3, we tested the effect of communication on withholding 
effort. First, in H3a we predicted that communication would reduce withholding effort for 
company owned units. The statistical test did not support this hypothesis (H3a: .36, p-value < 
.05).  For H3b, we predicted that communication would decrease withholding effort for 
franchisee units. The statistical test supported the direction of the relationship, although it turned 
out to be insignificant (H3b: -.18, p-value NS). Therefore, both H3a and H3b were rejected.  
The next set of hypotheses investigated the impact of the business environment. For 
Hypothesis 4, we predicted that competition between the dealers within the same brand affects 
withholding effort negatively for company owned-unit dealers (H4a) and for franchisee-unit 
dealers (H4b). Our statistical test supported this hypothesis for the company owned units (H4a: -
.23, p-value < .05), but the franchisee unit results were not significant (H4b: -.03, p-value NS).  
Hypothesis 5 predicted that inter-brand competition negatively affects withholding effort. Our 
statistical test supported H5a, that inter-brand competition reduces withholding effort for the 
company owned-units (H5a: -.29, p-value < .05), as well as H5b, which predicted a negative 
relationship from inter-brand competition on withholding effort for the franchisee units (H5b: -
.33, p-value < .05).   
The sample size in the two company owned-unit and franchisor-unit samples were rather 
small, with 84 respondents for the company owned-units (yielding 42 paired dyads), and 60 
respondents for the franchise-units (yielding 30 paired dyads). Therefore, we ran a power-test to 
investigate the Type-II error rate in the study, given the observed alpha-level at .05; six 
predictors, the observed R-square, and the paired dyads sample sizes. The observed Beta-level for 
the company owned-units sample reports a Beta-level at 87 percent [1 - .13 (observed beta level) 
= .87], which is within the recommended 80 percent level. The Beta-level for the franchise-units 
sample is 80 percent [1 - .20 (observed beta level) = .80], which is within the 80 percent level.  
Results of this study supported seven out of 10 hypotheses, one of these at a marginal 
level of significance. The explained variance for free riding was 31 percent for the company 
owned units and 37 percent for the franchisee units. In our final test to validate the causality 
structures, we ran a Wald test to determine whether the model was overfitted. This test 
determined whether sets of parameters, specified as free in the model, could simultaneously be 
set to zero without substantial loss in the model fit (Bentler,  2006). The Chi-square test of each 
parameter, given a p-value > .05, suggests dropping the relationship between inter-brand 
competitions and free riding for the franchisee-units, with a Chi-square at .02.  
 
Endogeneity 
When testing for endogeneity, the first step in Maddala’s (1983) two step procedure tested 
whether governance factors of centralization, formalization and communication affected the 
retail unit’s contractual choice. These analyses were based on the dealer sample. This test was 
based on result from a probit regression analysis (Ghosh and John, 2009, p. 605) of the two 
governance choice dimensions (see Model 3 in Table 4). The model reported a pseudo R-square 
of 0.18. The coefficient for centralization was significant (p < .01) and negative, indicating that 
the likelihood of choosing a franchise governance contract decreased with the level of 
centralization. Therefore, this analysis indicated that centralized decision making reduced the 
likelihood that actors would choose franchise. In other words, franchisees tend to avoid 
centralization though self-selection. This finding relates to the structural equation analysis (see 
Model 2 in Table 4) where the level of centralization increased franchisees potential to withhold 
effort. One can therefore speculate that franchisees strive to avoid centralization since it hampers 
their individual freedom. To put it differently, franchise entrepreneurs seem to avoid rules and 
regulations, and when exposed to such system restrictions they will break the rules to facilitate 
their new thinking and behavior. These findings capture the tensions among franchise 
entrepreneur’s individual freedom on the one hand, and the standardization to secure the brand 
value within the franchise chain at the other. The coefficient for formalization was non-
significant and negative (p = NS) (see Model 3 Table 4). This indicates that formalization had 
little influence on ownership type. Therefore, formalization did not seem to affect contractual 
choice ex-ante. Finally, the coefficient for communication were positive and significant (p < .05). 
It shows that the probability of choosing a franchise governance contract increased with the level 
of communication. In the structural equation modeling analysis (Model 2 in Table 4) there was a 
negative effect from communication on the potential to withholding efforts among franchisees. 
Therefore, franchisees facilitate communication as a governance factor, both when choosing 
franchisee as contractual affiliation, and as a factor reducing their opportunistic behavior.  
The second step in Maddala’s (1983) two step procedure tested whether the potential to 
withholding effort affected the retail unit’s contractual choice (Model 4 and 5 in Table 4). This 
answers the questions of what gain in withholding effort franchise firms would achieve by 
following their strategy rather than being internally organized. A switching regression model was 
used to identify potential sources that contributed to the difference in withholding efforts within 
the two contractual arrangements (Maddala, 1983). In these models the analysis regress 
withholding efforts against the same independent variable as the first-stage model, in addition to 
two inverse Mills-ratios computed from the same first-stage model (Maddala, 1983). The first 
inverse Mills-ratio coefficient measured actor’s self-selection into company owned-unit contract, 
whereas the second inverse Mills-ratio coefficient measured actor’s self-selection into franchise-
unit contract. As such, this analysis of withholding efforts was based on the two contracting 
stages; (1) behavior arising from the company owned-units contractual arrangement, and (2) 
behavior arising from the franchise contractual arrangement.  Both inverse Mills ratio coefficients 
in these two equations reported negative signs (see Model 4 and 5 in Table 4).  Since the inverse 
Mills ratio coefficient is always positive in the binary strategy choice case (see Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003, p. 64), one can expect that firms who choose franchise contract had above 
average level of withholding effort compared to the company owned units. Therefore, there is a 
selection bias into franchise contract with regards to withholding efforts (see Model 5 in Table 4). 
Further, the negative inverse Mills ratio coefficient for company owned units was non-significant 
(Model 4 in Table 4). This implies that the analysis did not identify any selection bias into these 
types of contracts.  
When considering the two covariate terms together, both being negative, franchise firms 
would have above average level of withholding efforts regardless of whether they chooses a 
franchise or an internal contract. Company owned units would encounter below average level of 
withholding efforts, regardless of whether they choose a franchise or an internal contract. This 
indicates that franchise firms have what would be called an “absolute advantage” (see Hamilton 
and Nickerson, 2003), meaning that their tendency to withhold effort exceed that of company 
owned units, regardless of what kind of contractual arrangement all of them make. Of course, the 
label absolute advantage is a bit misleading when using withholding effort as dependent variable, 
although the intention behind the label is illustrative.  
To summarize, the analysis showed that centralization and communication affected retail-
units self-selection within the plural form arrangement. The next question answers how much 
damage a wrong contractual form causes the franchisor. Because the contract form is 
endogenous, the impact of the two drivers (centralization and communication) cannot be 
ascertained simply by inspecting the regression coefficients in the endogeneity analysis (see Gosh 
and John, 2009, p. 607). In the following figures, we calculated and illustrated the governance 
costs of making the wrong plural form, given the governance dimensions of centralization and 
communication. These calculation followed the procedure of Mayer and Nickerson (2005, p. 
237). When assessing the single independent variables, the other independent variables, as well 
as the control variables, are held at their observed sample averages. Because we were concerned 
about a randomly selected (hypothetical) project and not an observed project, we did not include 
the inverse Mills ratio term. We calculated expected outcomes under four combinations: the two 
governance choices under low versus high (two standard deviations below and above the 
observed means, respectively) levels of each of the focal independent variables of interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 
Governance costs of centralization under alternative contract forms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14,91  
 20,49  
 14,69  
 12,66  
 -
 5,00
 10,00
 15,00
 20,00
 25,00
Low High
Po
te
nt
ia
l f
or
 W
ith
ho
ld
in
g 
ef
fo
rt
 
Centralization 
  Internal-unit    Franchise-unit
Mistaken 
choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommended  
choice 
 
Recommended 
choice 
 
 
 
 
Mistaken 
choice 
 
  
 
Figure 3 
Governance costs of communication under alternative contract forms 
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 Seen from the franchisors point of view, Figure 2 illustrates the costs of centralization 
when implementing the wrong plural form. For company owned-units the costs of implementing 
a low- instead of a high degree of centralization, withholding effort increases with 2.03 points. 
For franchise-units the costs of implementing a high- instead of a low degree of centralization, 
withholding effort increased with 5.58 points. Figure 3 illustrates the costs of communication 
when implementing the wrong plural form. For company owned-units the costs of implementing 
a high- instead of a low degree of communication, withholding effort increased with 0.72 points. 
For franchise-units the costs of implementing a low- instead of a high degree of communication, 
withholding effort increased with 2.47 points. 
 
Discussion  
Management of the franchisor-franchisee relationship is a necessary element of any 
franchise system, yet it involves a struggle to avoid opportunistic behavior by both parties, which 
can threaten the survival of the system.  This study focused on one element of that struggle: 
Withholding effort in franchise units and the impact of governance mechanisms in controlling 
such activities.  This study extended transaction cost theory from dyadic buyer-seller 
relationships to brand protection in plural-formed franchise organizations.  In addition, a key 
finding is that the effects of structural mechanisms on curbing the potential for opportunistic 
behavior vary between company owned units and franchised units, thus revealing insights into 
the complex nature of plural-formed governance and ownership.  
The results indicate that the franchisor may be able to address shirking in company owned 
units through increased centralization of decisions. The company owned units do not lose sales 
revenue as a result of following quality restrictions in brand representation, thus the employee 
manager has no economic incentive to avoid supplying quality. Centralized decisions might 
reduce role ambiguity and conflicts for company owned units (Nygaard and Dahlstrom,  2002). 
Thus, reduced role ambiguity in brand representation may lower the potential for shirking.  
 On the other hand, centralization of decision making may result in extra costs for the 
franchisee units by extending operating hours and varying products and services, for example. 
These decisions can raise the franchisee’s costs but will not necessarily increase the benefits of 
operating the brand.  Thus, the franchisee units that have to bear extra costs associated with brand 
operations may tend to lower quality efforts. The results support previous observations that 
centralization may raise the level of transaction costs (Eccles and White,  1988) and indicate that 
centralization may hinder franchisee motivation for productive efforts and undermine 
commitment to quality standards.  The findings regarding the differential effects of centralization 
on company owned and franchisee units is consistent with Crosno and Dahlstroms’ (2008) meta 
analysis, which indicated that centralization increased free riding more in interfirm relationships 
than in intrafirm relationships. 
The study results suggest that formalization may increase the potential for shirking in 
company owned units. Company owned units are not outcome dependent agents, so more 
formalization does not decrease their risk (Bergen et al., 1992), but serves as a costly constraint 
imposed on their operations.  Among franchisee units, higher levels of formalization lead to 
lower levels of opportunistic behavior. This finding is consistent with the theory that franchisee 
units are risk averse and appreciate the predictable source of governance that formalization offers 
(Bergen et al., 1992). Formalization adds stability, predictability and less complexity to the 
interfirm business environment, thus it seems to create commitment to brand representation 
among the franchisee units.  
 Regarding communication, the opposite result of what was hypothesized occurred for the 
company owned units as increased communication related to a higher potential for withholding 
effort. Communication reflects cooperation offered by the franchisor to the retail units. Earlier 
studies have emphasized that high levels of interactive cooperation might foster a “groupthink” 
situation lacking critical views, room for disagreement and new ideas (Janis,  1972). Strong 
bonds between the franchisor’s corporate representatives and the employee managers in the 
company owned units may reduce respect for quality restrictions. Often, the personal connections 
of sales area managers in the franchisor company are closer with company owned unit managers 
than with franchisees. In this situation, increased cohesiveness between sales area managers and 
unit managers may limit fruitful discussion between the parties about quality signals in the brand, 
possibly explaining why communication is positively linked to shirking in company owned units.  
Alternatively, the unit manager may perceive communications that we measured – assistance 
with budgets, marketing plans and accounting -- as unnecessary micro-management or 
unwarranted interference, thus raising potential for shirking by the unit.   
Competition in the business environment, both intra-brand and inter-brand, served to 
constrain the potential for withholding effort in company owned units. These findings support 
theoretical perspectives that competition provides comparative information in the market, 
allowing retail units to control one another (Akerlof, 1970). Whenever the dealer observes and 
compares market performance, the market acts as an incentive mechanism (Lazear and Rosen,  
1981).  Our data also indicate that inter-brand competition reduces potential for withholding 
effort among franchisee units.  Thus, competition might supplement hierarchical control 
structures. As noted, competition has a consistent effect on company owned units. Both intra-
brand and inter-brand competition seem to control the dealer’s representation in the market. 
Consistent with Parmigiani (2007), our findings support the notion that competition is an 
important managerial instrument in plural systems. Competition as added control is interesting 
because company owned units are less outcome dependent than franchisee units. Thus, company 
owned units have stronger incentives to shirk quality restrictions under weaker competitive 
circumstances. 
 Whereas research on franchise systems indicates brand name value affects the level of 
vertical control (Lafontaine and Shaw,  2005), earlier empirical studies relate brand name value 
to a low degree of vertical control (Hellenier and Lavergne,  1979; Lall,  1978). We speculate that 
reputation is associated with the service rather than product. Service quality is often easily 
observable in convenience store gas stations, whereas product quality such as differences 
between premium and regular gasoline are more difficult for consumers to monitor. Therefore, 
there is potential for withholding effort in a franchisor-dealer relationship because an essential 
part of the service interaction between customer and retail unit is difficult and costly to control. 
The dealer’s information superiority and lack of willingness to provide information (Dant and 
Nasr, 1998) increases the possibility of withholding effort. 
  The finding that centralized governance seems to increase withholding effort among 
franchisee units sheds light on empirical results indicating that a combination of decentralized 
management and outcome-based contracts results in free riding (Knez and Simester,  2001).  As 
is the case in franchise systems, centralization is based on relationship information. However, 
agency theory emphasize that information asymmetry might reduce the quality of information 
and efficiency of centralized decisions (Bergen et al., 1992). Alternatively, withholding effort 
may lead to greater levels of centralized decision making, thus, future research should investigate 
causal direction and address one weakness of the current study by obtaining longitudinal data. 
Furthermore, longitudinal research might also control for life cycle theory of plural formed 
franchise systems (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968; Manolis et al., 1995). In addition, measurement of 
actual opportunistic behavior rather than the potential for such behavior to occur would 
strengthen the conclusions. Future studies might also test for interaction effects between 
governance mechanisms, channel and business environment characteristics on withholding effort 
and examine the relative efficacy of transactional and relational mechanisms in cross-cultural 
franchise arrangements.  Finally, research into franchisor withholding effort, e.g., unfair contract 
agreements and profit distributions (Lawrence and Kaufmann,  2010) and its connection to 
incidences of negative franchisee exits (Frazer and Winzer,  2005) would offer a more complete 
picture of  the relationship. Franchisor withholding effort should also be studied in terms of 
franchisee perceptions that the contributions of the franchisor are diminishing and how such 
perceptions  may lead to a shift in power toward franchisees, resulting in increasing compliance 
and commitment hazards (Davies et al., 2011), a cycle of withholding effort that damages the 
system.     
This study raises practical implications for franchising system strategy in that the results 
support the application of centralization among company owned units and formalization among 
franchisee units.  Thus, alternate effects of centralization and formalization should be given 
managerial focus as alternative governance dimensions. This is especially important for brand 
management based on less formalization, such as administrative systems and first generation 
franchise systems. The damaging effect of centralized decisions in franchisee units should be 
followed up with managerial analyses designed to determine how centralized decisions may be 
mitigated, redefined or even replaced by more formalized governance structures.  
In terms of brand competition, managers of plural franchise systems may reduce the level 
of costly control mechanisms when such competition provides disciplinary incentives. Success of 
international expansion of plural franchise systems strongly depends on strategies that safeguard 
brand names against such forms of withholding effort such as free riding and shirking. 
In conclusion, shirking and free riding among dealers undermines brand reputation, 
jeopardizes long-term channel viability, and is a welfare loss to the economy (Aaker,  1996). 
Thus, relational systems such as franchise chains must employ a cornerstone strategy to guard 
against it.  Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) emphasized the need to describe free riding more 
accurately.  As withholding effort involves a shortage of quality relationships between firms, the 
phenomena of shirking and free riding can be identified as an undersupply of quality that affects 
brand perceptions in the market.  This investigation attempts to refine how dimensions of 
interfirm governance and ownership relate to undersupply of quality. Transaction cost theory 
predicts that opportunistic behaviors are transaction costs related to interfirm relationships. A test 
of our model generally supports relationships among transactional governance dimensions, 
plural-formed ownership structures and the potential for withholding effort.  
By applying a paired-dyadic data approach to structural equation modeling, this study 
presents a unique basis for the empirical investigation of governance mechanisms in franchise 
organizations. Because we obtain the predictor and the criterion variables from different sources 
(Viswanathan,  2005), our statistical test requires no additional remedies (Podsakoff et al.,  2003).  
Therefore, the ability to link the different information sources together creates a unique dataset, 
which controls for confounding effects of shared method biases in the analysis. Thus, this study 
also contributes to methods for interorganizational research in corporate, small firm, franchising 
and plural-form contexts.  
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Appendix 
Items in final measurement model 
 
 Potential for 
 withholding  
    effort 
To what extent do the following sentences give an erroneous or correct description?1 
(dealer) 
Item1 
 
It is totally unnecessary to control the way customer service is done at our station 
Item2 The company restriction to wear uniforms is necessary (Reversed) 
Item3 The company restrictions to keep the station clean and tidy are necessary and relevant to 
us and our station (Reversed) 
Item4 It is no problem to keep the station perfectly clean even when there are a lot of customers 
(Reversed) 
Company owned-
units/ Franchisee-units 
(dealer) 
Please mark the kind of contract you have with the  
Company-owned and dealer-operated units (employee managers) (company owned-units)  
 Company-owned and operated units (employee managers) (company owned-units) 
 Franchisee-owned and operated units (franchisee-units) 
Centralization 
(manager) 
Through your cooperation with the dealer, there are a number of matters where the 
company has more or less influence. Please indicate the extent to which you consider the 
company influences the dealer’s decisions regarding his/her own business on the 
following matters?2  
Item1 Loan warrant 
Item2 Opening hours at the station 
Item3 Design at the station 
Item4 Whether equipment other than cash register and fuel pumps shall be bought at the station 
Item5 Determination of salaries to employees at the station 
Formalization 
(manager) 
In the relationship between the gasoline company and this dealer, there are established 
more or less defined routines, procedures, rules and plans about how various problems 
should be solved. To what extent do the following statements represent a correct or an 
erroneous of this aspect of the relationship?1  
Item1 There are clear routines for how the dealer should run his or her sales work with 
customers 
Item2 Clear routines are developed for handling customer complaints 
Item3 There are clear routines for dealing with the customers and customer service 
Item4 There are clear routines for the design of the station’s shop 
Communication  
(manager) 
The company offers this dealer cooperation in a number of business activities. How often 
do you cooperate with the dealer in the following activities?3 
Item1 We cooperate with the dealer in order to develop budgets  
Item2 We cooperate with the dealer in order to design marketing plans 
Item3 We help the dealer to improve his/her competitive position 
Item4 We have continuous interactive contact with the dealer 
Item5 We help the dealer with economic analysis and accounting questions. 
 
Item6 
 
We help the dealer with questions regarding human resource management 
Item7 We help the dealer to improve his/her purchasing routines and inventory control 
Intra-brand 
competition 
(dealer) 
Is this a good or a bad description of your situation?4 
Item1 The competition between “the company name” dealers in this market is very fierce 
Inter-brand 
competition 
(dealer) 
Is this a good or a bad description of your situation?4  
Item1 The competition between the dealers in this market is very fierce regardless of brand 
Firm size 
(dealer) 
 
Item1 a) Net operating income/gross sales revenue in NOK millions  
1 = 1 erroneous description, to 7 completely correct description 
2 = 1 no influence, to 7 complete control 
3 = 1 never, to 7 always 
4 = 1 very strongly disagree, to 7 very strongly agree 
 
 
 
